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A comparative analysis of 15 developing countries shows that, during the 1990s, indirect taxes, 
tariffs, and exchange rates significantly discriminated against agriculture in only one country 
(Malawi), was largely neutral in five (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, and Zimbabwe), 
provided a moderate subsidy to agriculture in four (Mexico, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Zambia), and 
strongly favored agriculture in five (Egypt, Korea, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tunisia). In contrast 
to earlier partial equilibrium results, our general equilibrium analysis indicates that exchange rate 
changes can lead to anything between strongly increasing and strongly decreasing relative 
agriculture/non-agriculture incentives, depending on relative trade shares and relative tradability of 
agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. Country-specific circumstances greatly affect the 
relative impact of trade policies on agriculture and the rest of the economy in a general equilibrium 
setting. Earlier partial equilibrium measures of policy bias could not adequately incorporate country 
heterogeneity and are therefore likely to have overstated the bias. In any case, from the empirical 
results with our sample of countries, we conclude that any incentive bias against agriculture in the 
1980s had mostly disappeared by the 1990s. 
 
JEL classification: D58, O10, Q18 
 




We would like to thank Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Hans Lofgren, Alberto Valdés, Joachim von Braun, 
and Xiaobo Zhang as well as participants at various seminars for useful comments on earlier drafts.   




“Getting prices right” was a rallying call when developing countries started re-orienting 
their economic policies in the early 1980s. The agricultural sector, in particular, was seen 
as being damaged by trade and macroeconomic policies that favored urban industry. The 
existence of an incentive bias against agriculture was affirmed in the late 1980s by a major 
World Bank research project carried out under the direction of Anne O. Krueger (Krueger, 
Schiff, and Valdés, 1988; Krueger, 1992; Schiff and Valdés, 1992; and Bautista and 
Valdés, 1993).
1 The research team analyzed data from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s 
and concluded that reductions in trade distortions such as import tariffs and export taxes 
and the elimination of overvalued exchange rates would greatly improve agricultural 
performance and contribute to economic growth.  
 
The above studies relied on partial equilibrium analysis, focusing on the agricultural sector, 
with little attention to intersectoral linkages and feedback effects from changes in incomes 
and relative prices. They have nevertheless continued to play a highly influential role in the 
thinking about the way in which economic policy affect incentives and associated resource 
pulls in developing countries. An illustrative example is Krueger (1998), included in the 
Controversy on trade and policy reform published by the Economic Journal in September 
of 1998 (with an introduction by Dixon, 1998). Reviewing Krueger’s arguments, it is 
apparent that one of the remaining challenges in this area of economic inquiry is the need 
to move toward a more comprehensive understanding of the sector implications of trade 
and exchange rate policy and their measurement.
2 
 
Fortunately, new data in the form of economy-wide social accounting matrices (SAMs) 
have recently become available for a large number of developing countries. They allow us 
to shed fresh light in this paper on past perceptions, taking account of general equilibrium 
interactions, to help clarify both (i) the extent to which the agricultural incentive bias 
continues to exist and (ii) the limitations of partial equilibrium measures of the bias.  
 
Our main purpose is to provide general equilibrium measures of agricultural policy bias in 
the 1990s for a sample of 15 developing countries. We develop single-country CGE 
models, based on data that include agricultural detail to assess how indirect taxes, including 
import tariffs and export taxes, and current account imbalances affected relative 
agricultural price incentives.
3 In addition, simulations of agricultural export taxes, non-
agricultural import tariffs, and exchange rate appreciation are carried out to study the 
impact of trade policies, traditionally applied to protect industrial production sectors. 
                                                 
1 This discussion formed part of a broader debate about development strategy and “urban bias”. The term was 
coined by Michael Lipton (1977) to describe the general tension in developing countries between rural-urban 
and industry versus agriculture. A recent contribution based on an information theoretic approach is 
Majumdar, Mani and Mukand (2004). 
2 This observation is in tune with the Feature on trade liberalization and economic performance published by 
the Economic Journal in February of 2004. Here a variety of authors provide insights into other aspects of the 
trade reform process in a stimulating attempt to push the debate forward (see for example Santos-Paulino and 
Thirlwall, 2004; and Winters, 2004). 
3 Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002), which is an earlier version of this paper, contains full details on the 
modeling methodology. 
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Further background for the study is presented in Section 2; country models and data sets 
are summarized in Section 3; results of the various simulations are reviewed in Section 4; 
and conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Measuring the Incentive Bias 
 
To quantify the impact of policy regimes on relative agricultural price incentives, Krueger 
and her colleagues studied a representative group of 18 developing countries.
4 They 
distinguished between direct and indirect policy measures affecting agricultural price 
incentives. Direct policy measures were defined to include all measures, which affected the 
wedge between agricultural producer and border prices directly. These measures typically 
included domestic agricultural taxes and subsidies, export taxes on cash crops, and import 
tariffs on food crops. In contrast, indirect policy measures were defined as economy-wide 
measures, affecting the difference between relative agricultural producer and border prices. 
Indirect measures came under two main headings: (i) industrial protection policies, and (ii) 
overvaluation of the exchange rate. The former group of industrial protection measures 
included industrial import tariffs and quotas, as well as domestic industrial taxes and 
subsidies. The overvaluation of the exchange rate was measured by the depreciation 
required to eliminate the non-sustainable part of the current account deficit in addition to 
the exchange rate impact of other trade policy interventions.  
 
The quantification of direct and indirect effects of domestic tax and trade policies on 
agricultural price incentives was primarily based on the computation of nominal protection 
rates (NPRs). The total NPR for a given traded agricultural product was defined as the 
proportional difference between (i) the ratio of the agricultural producer price and a non-
agricultural producer price index, and (ii) the ratio between the agricultural border price 
and a non-agricultural border price index, both measured at the equilibrium exchange rate. 
Subsequently, the total NPR was additively decomposed into (i) a direct NPR measuring 
the impact on relative prices of differences between agricultural producer and border prices 
measured at the current exchange rate, and (ii) an indirect NPR measuring the impact on 
relative prices of differences between non-agricultural producer and border prices, and 
between the current and equilibrium exchange rates. 
 
The study by KSV, which covered the period 1975-84, presented NPRs for one agricultural 
tradable good from each of the 18 countries in their sample. The results indicated that 
exported agricultural products suffered from both direct and indirect nominal protection. 
Using simple averages, KSV found that agricultural export goods suffered from a negative 
direct NPR of –11 percent, while import-competing agricultural goods benefited from a 
positive direct NPR of around 20 percent. KSV also found that the direct NPRs were 
swamped by the economy-wide indirect NPRs, averaging –27 percent. Accordingly, the 
KSV study concluded that indirect effects dominated direct effects and that total nominal 
protection was negative for all types of (traded) agricultural goods. While KSV used 
nominal protection as their measure of relative price distortion, they acknowledged that a 
more appropriate measure would be the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP), which also 
                                                 
4 Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988), and Schiff and Valdés (1992) will henceforth be referred to as KSV and 
SV.  
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takes distortions in input prices into account. However, “Due mainly to data inadequacy…” 
the study by KSV contains no results on ERPs. 
 
The SV study included the same sample of 18 countries, but extended the period of 
coverage to 1960-84 and generalized the results by extending the number of agricultural 
goods. Accordingly, SV reported average agricultural NPRs, which were based on “…four 
to six agricultural commodities, and that coverage typically represented between 40 and 80 
percent of net agricultural product”. Their results were qualitatively similar to those of 
KSV. They confirmed that agricultural exports and imports faced NPRs of respectively –13 
percent and 14 percent, on average; and that these direct effects were dominated by indirect 
NPRs, averaging –22 percent. Moreover, SV reasserted the conclusion arrived at by KSV 
that total nominal protection was on average negative for all types of traded agricultural 
goods. The SV study also found that the nominal disprotection of traded agricultural goods 
increased over time, and that “…industrial protection has penalized agriculture more than 
overvaluation of the exchange rate in two-thirds of the countries examined”.
5  
 
Based on the assumption that all agricultural goods are traded, KSV and SV argued that 
their results (for the chosen set of goods) were representative for the overall agricultural 
sector. The SV study did recognize that “…traded products have non-tradable components, 
including some distribution and marketing costs.” Yet, no attempt was made to take 
account of these non-tradable components of domestic agricultural production, and the 
same goes for their underlying causes in the form of marketing costs and qualitative 
differences from world market goods. Perfect substitution between domestic and world 
market goods was assumed, and general equilibrium effects were ignored. 
 
In contrast, the current study considers imperfect substitution between domestic and world 
market goods as well as general equilibrium effects. Moreover, the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) framework allows direct computation of relative value added prices 
under various policy scenarios, which measure resource pulls in factor markets and provide 
a theoretically appropriate measure of effective rates of protection.
6 Bautista et al. (2001) 
compare analytically the partial and general equilibrium measures of bias, indicating the 
implications of the strong simplifying assumptions embodied in the partial equilibrium 
measures. They conclude that these simplifications are likely to lead to an overstatement of 
the policy bias against agriculture in a developing country. 
 
 
3. Country Models and Data Sets 
 
The analysis is based on a “standard” trade-focused computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model fully described in Löfgren et al. (2002).
7 The model is applied to each of the sample 
countries with almost no differences in model specification across the countries. The 
applications are necessarily somewhat stylized to achieve comparability, neglecting 
                                                 
5 NPRs are further reviewed below (Table 5). 
6 The implications of assuming imperfect “tradability” for the use of the ERP measure are explored in 
Devarajan and Sussangkarn (1992), and de Melo and Robinson (1981). 
7 The standard model arose from work on a number of country models with an agricultural focus. An early 
example is Arndt, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp (2000). For more details on the application to the 15 countries 
in this paper see Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp (2002).  
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country-specific institutional details while capturing the wide differences in country data. 
References to more detailed case studies of all the countries in the sample are provided in 
the references section. The few cases where country-specific behavior has been imposed on 
the model are duly noted.  
 
The data set consists of Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) for the 15 countries listed in 
Table 1. All SAM data sets are from the 1990s and include significant agricultural detail. 
The sample includes upper middle-income and high-income countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Korea, and Mexico, and lower middle-income and low-income countries such as 
Costa Rica, Egypt, Indonesia, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunisia, 
Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The sample countries are geographically dispersed, 
including five countries from Southern Africa, three from Northern Africa, five from Latin 
America, and two from Asia. There is an overlap of six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, 
Korea, Morocco, and Zambia) with the sample used in KSV and SV. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The 15 SAM data sets differ in terms of (i) the disaggregation of production sectors, (ii) the 
disaggregation of primary factors of production, and (iii) the inclusion of marketing costs 
and home consumption of own production. The disaggregation of production sectors and 
production factors can be gauged from Table 1. All data sets account separately for value 
added by labor and capital, but nine data sets also include land as an agriculture-specific 
production factor. To make simulations comparable across countries, capital was 
disaggregated into agricultural and non-agricultural capital so as to create agricultural-
specific production factors in all country models. Apart from being a reasonable 
assumption for the current type of medium-term simulations, it has the added benefit of 
making our factor market closure comparable to the KSV and SV studies. Accordingly, this 




The economic structure of the 15 country models can be seen in Table 2. The countries 
differ widely according to the importance of the agricultural sector. Poorer southern 
African countries like Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia are very dependent on 
agricultural production, while countries like Costa Rica and Zimbabwe have more 
specialized agricultural sectors. In contrast, more developed middle- and high-income 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela have smaller agricultural 
sectors, whereas northern African countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as 
Indonesia, have moderately large agricultural sectors. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
                                                 
8 The fisheries sector was inconsistently defined among the various SAM data sets. It was defined as an 
agricultural sector in Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico, Tanzania, and Zambia, and as an industry sector in 
Mozambique. In the Argentina, Korea, Morocco, Tunisia and Venezuela models, the fisheries sector was 
defined as an agricultural sector even though it used both agricultural and non-agricultural production factors. 
Finally, fishery was not defined as a separate production sector in the Brazil, Costa Rica, and Egypt country 
models.  
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Five countries including Argentina, Costa Rica, Malawi, Mexico, and Zimbabwe, have 
significantly higher agricultural export shares compared to their average non-agricultural 
export shares. Nevertheless, in the sample, the degree of dependence on trade in 
agricultural goods is unrelated to the relative size of the agricultural sector. Among the five 
countries with relatively high agricultural export shares, Argentina and Mexico are upper 
middle-income countries with small agricultural sectors; Costa Rica and Zimbabwe are 
lower-middle income and low-income countries with partly developed and moderately 
large agricultural sectors; and Malawi is a low-income country with a very large 
agricultural sector. Among the remaining 10 countries in the sample, there are six 
countries, including Korea, Venezuela, Mozambique, and the three northern African 
countries, which have relatively high agricultural import shares. Yet, these countries have 
higher average non-agricultural trade shares, due mainly to high industrial (import) trade 
shares. Finally, among the four countries with low agricultural trade shares, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Indonesia have high non-agricultural trade shares, while Brazil is a relatively 
closed economy with low overall trade shares. 
 
Seven of the country data sets include information on marketing margins, as shown in 
Table 3. The structure of marketing margin rates tends to provide an incentive bias against 
domestic agricultural production. An increase in the price of marketing services tends to 
increase industrial protection afforded by relatively high industrial import margin rates, and 





[Table 3 around here] 
 
From the structure of trade taxes and tariffs, presented in Table 4, export taxes are virtually 
non-existent. Tariff rates vary widely across the sample. Industrial tariff rates are generally 
higher than agricultural rates, with a few major exceptions (Korea, Morocco, and 
Venezuela). Domestic indirect taxes are generally much smaller than tariffs, and vary 
widely across sectors. Production taxes do not consistently tend to favor particular sectors 
across the sample of countries, while consumption taxes are generally lower for agriculture.  
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
The structure of domestic trade policy taxes in our sample is contrasted with NPRs in Table 
5 for the six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Korea, Morocco, and Zambia) that 
overlap with the sample used in KSV and SV.
10 The direct NPRs from the SV study 
indicate that there was direct nominal dis-protection of agricultural production (domestic 
prices below world prices) in Argentina, Egypt, Morocco, and Zambia during 1960-84. 
These changed to direct tariff protection in our sample period. Moreover, while direct 
nominal protection of agriculture decreased in Korea and Brazil, tariff protection for these 
                                                 
9 Large service production which does not incur marketing costs means that domestic non-agricultural 
marketing costs are relatively low on average. On the other hand, small service imports means that average 
non-agricultural marketing costs for imports are relatively high. The combined impact of marketing costs 
tends to reinforce the agricultural bias. The Zambian data set is unusual, since service sectors such as energy 
and construction incur marketing costs. 
10 Only import tariffs are tabulated in Table 4 since export taxes are absent for these six countries.  
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countries remained positive in our sample as well. A comparison between non-agricultural 
import tariffs and indirect NPRs is difficult. NPRs include exchange rate effects. 
Nevertheless, the SV study (page 16) asserts that “…industrial protection policies…had a 
greater effect on the indirect tax than did overvaluation of the real exchange rate.” Under 
this assumption, the data indicate a general reduction in protection of non-agricultural 
products in this period. Moreover, structural adjustment programs are likely to have 
reduced the impact of exchange rate effects, implying a decrease in indirect nominal dis-
protection of agriculture between the period 1960-84 and our sample period. Altogether, 
the data indicate that nominal dis-protection of agriculture is likely to have vanished 
between the two sample periods. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
In sum, the sample countries represent a heterogeneous group; and it would appear that 
they provide a satisfactory degree of variation in the level of economic development, 
geographical location, and economic trade and tax structures for a comparative analysis of 
agricultural bias.  
 
 
4. Simulation Results 
 
This section presents two sets of simulations. Section 4.1 measures the historical level of 
agricultural bias, including the impact of indirect tax and tariff structures. Subsequently, 
Section 4.2 presents two groups of simulations along the lines of the single country-studies 
in Bautista et al. (2001) and Jensen and Tarp (2002), to assess the possible price incentive 
effects of a set of traditional ISI-type trade policies. 
 
All simulations in Section 4 were carried out using a macro closure in which aggregate 
investment is specified as a fixed share of total absorption. This simple macro closure 
assumes no major swings in macro aggregates in response to external shocks, and 
maintains focus on the tradability assumptions underlying the studies by KSV and SV. To 
keep investment fixed as a share of nominal absorption, household savings rates were 
assumed to vary proportionately. Furthermore, in line with the public finance literature, all 
simulations were carried out using a revenue-neutral specification of the government 
budget. In order to fix government revenue, household tax rates were allowed to vary 
proportionately. The factor market closure specifies full employment of available factor 
supplies. Finally, all simulations were carried out using a flexible real exchange rate and 
fixed foreign savings, except for the set of exchange rate simulations in Section 4.2, where 
the impact of a pre-set level of exchange rate appreciation is analyzed. 
 
We use the model in counterfactual mode, changing policy variables such as tax and tariff 
rates or introducing shocks to the exchange rate. Policy bias is measured by comparing the 
results for agriculture relative to non-agriculture before and after the change. For example, 
eliminating a policy which discriminates against agriculture will result in either an increase 
in agricultural prices or in additional resources being attracted to agriculture after the policy 
is removed. In the 15 country models used in this paper, fixed factors induce limitations on 
the movement of primary factors between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In 
this situation elimination of policy bias will result in little change in relative  
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agriculture/non-agricultural output. Instead the impact will be reflected mainly in changes 
of relative prices. This specification was chosen in order to make the results as comparable 
as possible with partial equilibrium measures that focus on relative price changes. To save 
space we report only the changes in relative prices below.
11  
 
4.1 Agricultural Bias in the 1990s 
 
The first set of five tax and tariff simulations includes a base run and four alternative 
simulations to measure the cumulative impact of eliminating: (1) production taxes, (2) 
consumption taxes, (3) export taxes, and (4) import tariffs. The results are presented in 
Table 6 and Figure 1. In the table, countries are grouped according to structural 
characteristics discussed below.  
 
[Table 6 around here] 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
These experiments indicate that indirect taxes and tariffs significantly discriminated against 
agriculture in only one country (Malawi), were largely neutral in five (Argentina, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Indonesia, and Zimbabwe), provided a moderate subsidy to agriculture in four 
(Mexico, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Zambia), and strongly favored agriculture in five 
(Egypt, Korea, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tunisia).  
 
For Malawi, Figure 1 shows that it is mainly consumption taxes which create the bias 
against agriculture. The major share of consumption tax revenue is derived from processed 
food, which indirectly taxes primary agricultural inputs. Malawi is a small, poor, densely 
populated country with a dualistic agriculture—extensive, small-holder subsistence farming 
alongside large-scale commercial farms. Marketing has historically been closely controlled 
by the Malawian government, with heavy indirect taxation of processing industries.
12  
 
At the other extreme, the tax structure in Morocco implies considerable protection of 
agricultural production. Figure 1 demonstrates that the whole Moroccan tax structure, 
including production and consumption taxes, but especially import tariffs, contributes to 
biasing price incentives in favor of agricultural production. The reason is to be found in the 
highly dispersed tariff structure, where very high tariffs protect domestic agricultural 
production sectors, including wheat and livestock, while high tariffs on manufactured 
imports are taxing domestic manufacturing sectors by increasing their input costs.
13 
 
Among the remaining 13 countries, three groups with broadly similar characteristics can be 
outlined as shown in Table 6. The first group (Argentina Zimbabwe, Brazil, and Costa 
Rica) has tax structures that are relatively neutral with respect to relative price incentives.  
Brazil and Argentina are upper middle-income countries with developed and competitive 
                                                 
11 For more details on this issue see Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp (2002).  
12 This Malawian system has been changing in the 1990s, especially for tobacco, where there has been rapid 
growth of production in small farms. 
13 The remaining selection of results presented in Figure 1 indicates how different countries put different 
weight on indirect tax instruments. The figure shows e.g. that Korea and Morocco use different measures, in 
the form of production taxes and import tariffs, to protect their agricultural sectors. The figure also indicates 
how e.g. Argentina, in contrast to Morocco, uses import tariffs to indirectly tax the agricultural sector.  
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agricultural sectors, specialized in livestock and cash crops, while the other two, Zimbabwe 
and Costa Rica, have competitive agricultural export sectors that are large-scale in nature 
and specialized in the production of cash crops, such as tobacco and cotton in the case of 
Zimbabwe. In spite of the relatively developed nature of agricultural (export) sectors, 
taxation of agricultural production remains relatively moderate. Moreover, indirect taxation 
of non-agricultural production has a relatively neutral impact on production incentives. In 
general, domestic indirect taxes tend to support relative agricultural price incentives, while 
import tariffs tend to protect non-agricultural production in this group of countries. 
 
The second group of countries consists of Indonesia and three poorer southern African 
countries, including Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique. They can be characterized as 
low-income countries with relatively large and underdeveloped agricultural sectors. Trade 
in agricultural goods is generally small, except in Mozambique, where regional differences 
in land fertility and agricultural demand, in addition to recurring natural calamities, imply 
that agricultural imports are moderately high from time to time. Nevertheless, the relatively 
large size and underdeveloped nature of agricultural production make taxation of non-
agricultural commodities the only viable means of raising tax revenue in these countries. 
Tariff structures, in particular, tend to be skewed towards taxation of non-agricultural 
imports. Since agricultural production technologies are very rudimentary while non-
agricultural production technologies are more input-intensive, this tends to lower non-
agricultural price incentives by increasing intermediate input costs. Combined with non-
agricultural production and consumption taxes, which tend to lower producer prices, the tax 
structure of these countries discriminates against non-agricultural production at all levels. 
The implicit level of agricultural protection ranges from three percent in Indonesia, to 6-13 
percent in the three southern African countries. 
 
The third group of countries, including Venezuela, Egypt, Tunisia, and Korea, has 
structural characteristics similar to those of the Moroccan economy. They have relatively 
small agricultural sectors that are insufficient to feed their populations, and are therefore 
dependent on imports of agricultural goods. In order to maintain some level of self-
sufficiency, these countries tend to impose tax-structures that favor agricultural production. 
In spite of fundamental similarities, they differ from Morocco in their approach to 
supporting agricultural price incentives. While Morocco relies strongly on agricultural 
import tariffs (e.g. to protect production of soft wheat), Korea relies more heavily on 
domestic differences between non-agricultural taxation and agricultural subsidization to 
generate price incentives in favor of agriculture (e.g. rice). Accordingly, the overall level of 
agricultural protection varies from seven percent in Venezuela and 17 percent in Korea, to 
between 11 and 32 percent in the northern African group of countries, including Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Morocco. 
 
Finally, Mexico stands out as the country where import tariffs have the smallest effects on 
relative price incentives. While Mexico has one of the most open economies in the sample, 
it maintains a relatively balanced trade account in both agricultural and non-agricultural 
goods, as well as a relatively uniform and non-distorting structure of import tariffs. 
Accordingly, the Mexican indirect tax structure resembles that of Korea: the main 
distortions arise from domestic differences between non-agricultural taxes and (small) 
agricultural subsidies. This results in an overall level of agricultural price support of six 
percent.  
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To summarize, the impact of indirect tax structures on relative price incentives is relatively 
neutral in our sample countries with developed and internationally competitive agricultural 
sectors. A moderate bias against non-agricultural production, and hence in favor of 
agriculture, was found in poorer southern African countries where indirect taxes on non-
agricultural commodities are the main source of government tax revenue. Finally, high 
levels of agricultural protection characterize the group of northern African countries and 
countries like Korea and Venezuela. Korea directly subsidizes agricultural production 
while Morocco maintains high protective tariffs on agricultural imports. In general, sectoral 
differences in tax and tariff rates (Table 4) account for the variation in results in Table 6. 
An empirical analysis of exchange rate overvaluation (not shown) is necessary to fully 
capture the direction and extent of the price incentive bias. The precise definition and 
measurement of a sustainable external deficit is a contentious issue. If the upper bound is 
set at three percent of absorption, only two sample countries show signs of agricultural 
bias. However, regardless of the choice of sustainable upper bound for the external deficit, 
most countries in our sample show no signs of agricultural bias in the 1990s.
14  
 
Section 4.2 Traditional ISI-policies 
 
Core elements of the traditional Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy strategy 
included an overvalued exchange rate as well as non-agricultural import tariffs to protect 
domestic non-agricultural production, and agricultural export taxes to raise revenue from 
the agricultural sector. In this section, we investigate the impact of each of these ISI-type 
policies on relative agricultural price incentives, by imposing a set of stylized tax and 
exchange rate policies on our sample of 15 single-country CGE models.  
 
Agricultural Export Tax and Non-Agricultural Import Tariff Simulations 
 
The first policy simulation is a uniform 25 percent tariff on non-agricultural imports. 
Results are presented in Figure 2, indicating that non-agricultural import tariffs, on balance, 
tend to improve relative agricultural price incentives. The figure illustrates how strong 
general equilibrium effects can reverse the nominal protection effect of non-agricultural 
import tariffs. In general, the impact on relative agricultural price incentives are negatively 
related to the ratio of agricultural versus non-agricultural trade shares. This relationship 
points to the importance of accompanying tariff-induced exchange rate appreciation, which 
tends to worsen relative price incentives for the types of goods traded most intensively. 
Non-agricultural import tariffs are therefore most likely to yield relative protection for non-
agricultural goods when relative agricultural trade shares are large. On the other hand, 
agricultural price incentives can improve strongly when relative agricultural trade shares 
are small. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
Figure 2 indicates that the strongest relative price declines occur among a group of 
countries, including Malawi, Costa Rica, and Argentina, which are characterised by high 
                                                 
14 An expanded analysis of indirect tax structures and exchange rate overvaluation can be found in Jensen, 
Robinson and Tarp (2002).  
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agricultural trade shares vis-à-vis non-agricultural trade shares. The results indicate that 
pervasive tariff protection induces 6–11 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate in 
the three aforementioned countries, leading to an 8–15 percent drop in relative agricultural 
value added prices. Given high agricultural trade shares, the real appreciation leads to 
lower relative agricultural prices. Induced changes in input costs further reinforce the 
impact of the overvalued exchange rates. Production technologies employed in (some of 
the) agricultural sectors use relatively large quantities of marketed, import-intensive, non-
agricultural inputs such as chemicals. 
 
The biggest relative price increases occur among a group of countries, including Indonesia, 
Mozambique, and Tunisia, which are mostly characterised by low trade shares in 
agriculture versus non-agriculture. Relative agricultural value added prices improve by a 
maximum of 7–17 percent among this group. Indonesia, Mozambique and Tunisia 
experience a 5–8 percent tariff-induced appreciation of the real exchange rate, which, 
combined with low agricultural trade shares, works to improve relative agricultural price 
incentives. Tariff-induced increases in non-agricultural input costs and 5–10 percent drops 




Mexico is a special case since non-agricultural import tariffs raise relative agricultural price 
incentives (slightly), in an environment of large relative agricultural trade shares. A key 
reason for this result is that Mexican imports consist mainly of intermediate and capital 
goods for further processing, where possibilities for import substitution are limited, which 
helps to improve relative agricultural value added prices. Brazil, Zambia, and Morocco are 
special cases as well, since non-agricultural import tariffs lower agricultural price 
incentives (slightly) for these countries, in an environment of small relative agricultural 
trade shares. In these cases, the direct protective impact of the import tariffs dominates the 
impact of the exchange rate appreciation, leading to a (small) decline in agricultural price 
incentives. 
 
A second policy simulation of a uniform 25 percent tax on agricultural exports (not shown) 
indicates that relative agricultural price incentives decline for every sample country. This 
general result holds regardless of the relative size of the agricultural trade share, showing 
that the direct terms-of-trade impact on agricultural producer prices in every case 
dominates the indirect impact of tax-induced exchange rate depreciation on nominal 
protection and input costs. 
 
Exchange Rate Simulations 
 
This set of experiments considers the effect of a 10 percent appreciation of the real 
exchange rate imposed exogenously for each sample country. The idea is to impose a 
uniform price shock for comparability with partial equilibrium studies. In order to conduct 
these experiments the macro-trade closure was changed from exogenous to endogenous 
trade-balance. Columns 1-2 in Table 7 present the current account deficit as a ratio of total 
                                                 
15 The marketing margin rates presented in Table 3 indicate that services do not incur marketing margins in 
Mozambique and Tanzania. Average margin rates are therefore generally highest for marketed agricultural 
goods.  
  12 
 
absorption before and after the 10 percent real appreciation. The change in this ratio is due 
entirely to a change in the balance of trade since external factor income flows are kept 
fixed. From the table, it is clear that initial current account deficits vary widely between 
sample countries ranging from a 19 percent deficit (Mozambique) to an 18 percent surplus 
(Venezuela). The table also shows that countries vary widely in the importance of trade. 
Column 3 in Table 7 presents trade shares (imports+exports/GDP), and they vary from 
around 15 percent (Argentina and Brazil) to around 85 percent (Costa Rica and Tunisia). 
 
[Table 7 around here] 
 
The sensitivity of the trade deficit to changes in the real exchange rate depends on: (i) 
initial trade shares, (ii) factor mobility which permits traded sectors to respond to changes 
in prices, and (iii) the sectoral trade substitution and transformation elasticities which also 
limit sectoral responses to price changes. The macro level responses presented in Table 7 
demonstrate a lot of heterogeneity among sample countries. The countries which show the 
largest change in the trade deficit (Malawi, Costa Rica, and Tunisia) all have very large 
trade shares. Similarly, countries with low trade shares (Argentina and Brazil) show little 
effect. Other countries, including the middle group (Indonesia, Zambia, Tanzania, and 
Mozambique) show moderately high trade shares due to high levels of import dependence. 
The essential nature of intermediate and capital goods imports implies that the trade 
balance is relatively insensitive to real exchange rate appreciation for these countries. 
 
Figure 3 presents the results of the 10 percent appreciation on the ratio of agriculture versus 
non-agriculture prices shown against the initial structure of agriculture/non-agriculture 
trade shares. A trade share ratio of one indicates that the initial trade share in agriculture 
(agricultural imports plus agricultural exports divided by agricultural GDP) is the same as 
in non-agriculture sectors. An index greater than one indicates a higher trade share for 
agriculture. The simulation leads to declining agricultural price incentives in seven 
countries, and improving agricultural price incentives in eight. The first group includes 
countries with relatively high agricultural trade shares (Malawi, Argentina, Zimbabwe, 
Costa Rica, and Mexico), in addition to Brazil and Morocco, which have relatively small 
agricultural trade shares. In contrast, the second group include poorer southern African 
countries with underdeveloped agricultural (export) sectors (Zambia, Tanzania, and 
Mozambique), Indonesia with low trade-shares and traditional net-importers of food like 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Korea. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
Among the group of countries with relatively large agricultural trade shares, agricultural 
price incentives decline in Malawi, Argentina, and Zimbabwe since reduced terms-of-trade 
for agricultural exports dominates the combination of (i) reduced terms-of-trade for non-
agricultural exports and (ii) reduced protection of import-competing non-agricultural 
production. Reduced protection of import-competing agricultural products further adds to 
declining relative agricultural price incentives in Costa Rica and Mexico. Agricultural trade 
shares are relatively small in Brazil and Morocco. Nevertheless, the exchange rate 
appreciation leads to lower relative agricultural price incentives in both of these countries, 
since reduced protection of traded food processing sectors feeds through to agricultural 
production sectors.  
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Most of the sample countries with smaller agricultural trade shares are net-importers of 
agricultural goods. An overvalued exchange rate therefore induces disprotection for import-
competing agricultural crops. More importantly, declining terms-of-trade for exports of 
non-agricultural goods and (tourist) services, and disprotection of import-competing non-
agricultural production, feed through to domestic prices because of high non-agricultural 
trade shares. Agricultural price incentives improve relatively strongly in Tunisia, where 
non-agricultural trade shares are particularly high. Korea and Venezuela stand out since 
they are characterized by particularly large agricultural imports. The exchange rate 
appreciation, nevertheless, improves relative agricultural price incentives by lowering price 
incentives for exports of manufactured goods in the case of Korea, and oil and gas in the 
case of Venezuela. 
 
With the exception of Brazil and Morocco, relative agricultural price incentives decline in 
countries which are characterized by having relative agricultural trade shares above one, 
and increase in countries where relative agricultural trade shares are below one. This result 
illustrates how the impact of exchange rate appreciation on relative price incentives 
depends crucially on the size of relative trade shares. Nevertheless, the importance of other 
country-specific characteristics such as marketing margins can also be judged by 
comparing the results of Tanzania and Mozambique to Zambia. Trade shares are similar, 
but relative agricultural price incentives increase particularly strongly in Zambia. The 
reason is that the price of marketing services increases in the two former cases, while it 
declines in the latter to the benefit of Zambian agriculture. 
 
Summing-up, in the original KSV analysis, the basic presumption was that developing 
countries had overvalued exchange rates and that this overvaluation led to an incentive bias 
against agriculture. In the present day world, characterized by structural adjustment 
programs in many countries, overvaluation is no longer a general phenomenon. In addition, 
results from the simulations in this paper indicate that overvaluation does not necessarily 





Empirical studies from the 1980s, using partial equilibrium methodologies, supported the 
view that policies in many developing countries imparted a major incentive bias against 
agriculture. Eliminating this bias therefore became one of the goals of policy reform 
strategies, including structural adjustment programs, supported by the World Bank and 
others; and many countries undertook such reforms in the 1990s. Relying on new data, this 
study has taken a general equilibrium approach to analyzing and measuring how indirect 
taxes and exchange rates affected relative price incentives for agricultural production in a 
representative sample of 15 developing countries during the 1990s.  
 
Our general equilibrium analysis indicates that the economywide system of indirect taxes, 
including tariffs and export taxes, significantly discriminated against agriculture in only 
one country, was largely neutral in five, provided a moderate subsidy to agriculture in four, 
and strongly favored agriculture in five.  
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Our sample includes six countries that were also included in a comparative World Bank 
study led by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés, (1988): Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Korea, 
Morocco, and Zambia. Our results show very limited signs of price incentive bias against 
agriculture in these countries during the 1990s. While estimated levels of agricultural 
protection in Brazil and Korea seems to have declined, findings in the Bank studies of 
strong levels of agricultural bias for Argentina, Egypt, Morocco, and Zambia are not borne 
out by our analyses. In sum, our results suggest that whatever bias there was to begin with, 
it was largely eliminated during the 1990s. 
 
Our empirical analysis also indicate that traditional ISI-type policies, including non-
agricultural import tariffs, agricultural export taxes, and overvalued exchange rates, can 
affect relative price incentives in strongly divergent directions, depending on country-
specific characteristics. The impact of non-agricultural import tariffs was found to depend 
strongly on relative agricultural trade shares and the impact of real exchange rate 
appreciation induced by the introduction of pervasive tariffs.  
 
Our stylized exchange rate simulations tend to reaffirm the conclusion from the World 
Bank studies that appreciation of the exchange rate, resulting from a current account 
deficit, can have a strong impact on relative price incentives for tradable goods, including 
tradable agriculture. Earlier partial equilibrium work, which assumed that agricultural 
goods were largely tradable, found that overvaluation of the exchange rate would always 
hurt the agricultural sector. However, in a general equilibrium setting, the impact of 
changes in the exchange rate on relative agriculture/non-agriculture incentives depends 
critically on relative trade shares, factor mobility, and sectoral trade elasticities. In our 
sample, overvaluation of the real exchange rate hurts agriculture relative to non-agriculture 
in seven countries, while it favors agriculture in eight, with wide variation in the size of the 
effect. 
 
Our results indicate that the partial-equilibrium measures used in earlier studies are likely 
to have overstated the bias against agriculture. In particular, our results point to the 
essential role of country-specific characteristics and the need to take them into account in a 
general-equilibrium framework when analyzing how tax and exchange rate policies affect 
relative price incentives for agricultural production. 
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Table 1. Sample Country Data 
    SAM Year    # SAM Sectors    GNP per Capita   
Country       Agriculture  Non-Agriculture Factors    (US$)   
Mozambique   1995   12  27  4   80   
Tanzania   1992    21  34  7*    120   
Malawi   1998    7  26  11*    170   
Zambia   1995    14  14  10*    400   
Zimbabwe   1991    24  12  9*   540   
Egypt   1997    13 14 5*    790   
Indonesia   1995    5  18  23*    980   
Morocco   1994    31  10  14*    1110   
Tunisia    1996    2 17 4    1820   
Costa Rica    1991    5  17  13    2610   
Mexico   1996    57  14  45*    3320   
Venezuela   1995    12  40  3   3020   
Brazil   1995    36 6 39*    3640   
Argentina   1993    13  31  3    8030   
Korea     1990     12  28  3     9700   
Source: SAM data from Trade and Macroeconomics Division, International Food Policy Research Institute – see specific 
country references; 1995 GNP per capita data from the World Bank, World Development Report, 1998. 
* Includes land as a factor. 
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Table 2. General Characteristics of Country Models 
    Composition (percent)  Trade Ratios (percent) 
   V AXEM E / X   M / Q  
Argentina Agriculture  5.5 4.1 16.6 1.2 14.4  1.7 
   Industry  15.3 25.3 66.8 66.7 9.4  13.4 
   Services  79.3 70.6 16.6 32.1 0.8  2.1 
Brazil Agriculture 9.5 7.7 5.3 4.4 2.5 2.6 
   Industry  26.4 43.6 81.9 80.7 6.9  8.8 
   Services  64.1 48.7 12.8 14.9 1.0  1.3 
Costa Rica  Agriculture  13.2 16.3 31.8 16.1 45.9  33.7 
   Industry  18.5 32.6 37.9 65.9 27.9  44.0 
   Services  68.3 51.1 30.3 18.0 13.9  9.9 
Egypt Agriculture  17.7 14.1 0.5 9.5 0.5 9.6 
   Industry  24.7 36.9 37.7 77.3 12.9  28.3 
   Services  57.6 49.0 61.8 13.2 15.9  4.3 
Indonesia Agriculture  18.4 12.8 2.1 2.9 1.7  2.9 
   Industry  30.1 39.9 82.9 78.4 23.2  27.2 
   Services  51.4 47.3 15.0 18.8 4.0  5.1 
Korea Agriculture  8.8 5.0 1.6 7.0 4.1  17.7 
   Industry  30.1 50.2 79.6 85.3 20.3  23.0 
   Services  61.1 44.8 18.8 7.7 5.4  2.3 
Malawi Agriculture  35.9 29.6 68.8 7.8 44.1 10.7 
   Industry  16.1 31.4 13.6 65.7 8.2  38.4 
   Services  48.0 38.9 17.7 26.5 8.7  15.8 
Mexico Agriculture  6.4 5.3 8.5 6.9 30.3 25.7 
   Industry  22.4 38.0 91.5 93.1 45.7  44.6 
   Services  71.2 56.7 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Morocco Agriculture  19.2 13.1 8.1 5.6 7.0  14.3 
   Industry  24.3 38.5 51.2 75.7 15.2  29.8 
   Services  56.6 48.4 40.8 18.7 9.6  5.6 
Mozambique Agriculture  25.9 16.6 4.9 6.0 2.3  22.2 
   Industry  10.4 15.6 43.0 75.7 27.6  67.3 
   Services  63.7 67.8 52.1 18.4 9.1  8.4 
Tanzania Agriculture  38.6 27.0 25.6 1.4 4.7  1.4 
   Industry  13.3 25.3 30.5 83.5 5.4  44.1 
   Services  48.1 47.8 43.9 15.1 5.3  6.1 
Tunisia Agriculture  14.8 9.8 1.2 4.4 1.9  9.6 
   Industry  22.4 43.4 67.1 88.2 35.2  45.4 
   Services  62.9 46.9 31.7 7.5 16.0  4.5 
Venezuela Agriculture  4.5 4.1 0.4 4.8 1.2  15.3 
   Industry  41.4 46.3 93.2 70.1 44.3  29.5 
   Services  54.1 49.6 6.5 25.1 3.0  6.5 
Zambia Agriculture  28.5 21.8 6.4 4.6 4.5  8.8 
   Industry  29.2 33.6 85.7 73.7 40.3  47.1 
   Services  42.3 44.6 7.9 21.8 2.5  10.9 
Zimbabwe Agriculture  15.3 13.6 41.9 0.6 36.1  1.6 
   Industry  31.7 36.8 35.5 93.8 11.8  37.3 
   Services  53.1 49.6 22.6 5.6 6.6  2.2 
NOTE: VA – Value Added, E – Exports, X – Production, M – Imports, Q – Demand.  




Table 3. Marketing Margins (Percent) 
   MRG DMRG/DC EMRG/E  MMRG/M 
Indonesia Agriculture  19.3 13.7 15.1  11.1 
 Industry  80.7 14.2 11.5  18.1 
Mozambique Agriculture  23.3 38.3 33.1  24.3 
 Industry  76.7 31.6 15.4  23.9 
Tanzania Agriculture  49.9 17.6 15.3  5.7 
 Industry  50.1 6.5 23.2  10.7 
Tunisia Agriculture  15.3 9.7 35.1  2.4 
 Industry  84.7 10.5 3.5  9.7 
Venezuela Agriculture  20.3 37.2 43.3  38.5 
 Industry  79.7 21.4 3.8  25.6 
Zambia Agriculture  16.2 17.3 22.8  15.3 
 Industry  68.4 19.7 20.7  16.1 
 Services  15.4 4.9 29.5  0.0 
Zimbabwe Agriculture  20.4 15.7 19.6  13.4 
 Industry  79.6 15.0 16.2  15.2 
NOTE: MRG – Total Marketing Margins, DC – Domestically Marketed Production, E – Exports, M – Imports, 
DMRG – Domestic Marketing Margins, EMRG – Export Marketing Margins, MMRG – Import Marketing Margins. 
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Table 4. Tax and Tariff Rates (Percent) 
      TA TQ TE  TM 
Argentina agriculture  0.4 1.1 -  7.4 
   industry  2.4 2.6 -  16.0 
   services  0.4 3.2 -  2.8 
Brazil agriculture  2.7 - -  5.9 
   industry  6.6 - -  12.1 
   services  8.4 - -  - 
Costa Rica  agriculture  1.0 1.8 0.2  7.3 
   industry  1.0 4.4 -2.2  8.1 
   services  1.7 2.5 0.8  3.6 
Egypt agriculture  0.0 1.8 -  10.9 
   industry  0.7 0.7 -  15.6 
   services  0.5 2.2 -  - 
Indonesia agriculture  - 0.7 - 2.6 
   industry  - 2.5 -  7.1 
   services  - 2.4 -  0.3 
Korea agriculture  -4.9 - -  13.9 
   industry  4.2 - -  9.0 
   services  3.9 - -  0.3 
Malawi agriculture  - 0.9 0.5  1.4 
   industry  - 7.3 -  8.8 
   services  - - -  - 
Mexico agriculture  -0.1 0.2 -  1.2 
   industry  1.8 1.3 -  2.1 
   services  2.2 0.8 -  - 
Morocco agriculture  - - -  159.8 
   industry  1.1 3.7 -  31.6 
   services  2.2 0.1 -  - 
Mozambique agriculture  -0.4 2.7 0.0  4.8 
   industry  -0.1 5.3 0.0  8.9 
   services  -0.1 1.3 -  - 
Tanzania agriculture  0.8 0.2 -  7.2 
   industry  2.0 3.2 -  5.0 
   services  0.5 0.1 -  - 
Tunisia agriculture  1.0 -3.6 -  2.5 
   industry  0.8 6.5 -  9.3 
   services  -0.8 1.7 -  - 
Venezuela agriculture  0.0 - -  12.0 
   industry  0.8 3.8 -  9.1 
   services  0.7 1.8 -  - 
Zambia agriculture  0.6 0.1 -  7.4 
   industry  4.2 1.9 -  13.5 
   services  1.0 1.2 -  13.1 
Zimbabwe agriculture  3.3 - -  20.2 
   industry  2.9 - -  23.8 
   services  3.1 - -  11.4 
NOTE: Average tax rates in percent for Production (TA), Consumption (TQ), Exports (TE), and Imports (TM). 
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Table 5. Import Tariffs and Nominal Protection Rates (Percent) 
      Import Tariff Rate, SAM Data     1960-84 NPR    
      Agriculture  Non-Ag.  Difference    Direct  Indirect  Total    
Argentina     7.4  11.7  -4.3    -17.8  -21.3  -39.1    
Brazil     5.9  10.3  -4.3    10.1  -18.4  -8.3    
Egypt     10.9  13.3  -2.4    -24.8  -19.6  -44.4    
Korea     13.9  8.3  5.6    39.0  -25.8  13.2    
Morocco     159.8  25.3  134.5    -15.0  -17.4  -32.4    
Zambia     7.4  13.4  -6.0    -16.4  -29.9  -46.3    
Source: Import Tariff Rates from own calculations; 1960-84 NPRs from Table 2-1 in Schiff and Valdés (1992). 
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Table 6. Indirect Tax Simulations 
(Relative Agricultural Value Added Prices) 
     Base Run    Sim. 1    Sim. 2    Sim. 3    Sim. 4   
     (INDEX)    (TA)    (TQ)    (TE)    (TM)   
Malawi    100.0   100.0  107.0  107.4  108.5  
Argentina    100.0   99.6  98.8  98.8   102.4   
Zimbabwe    100.0   98.5  98.5  98.5   102.4   
Brazil    100.0   99.3  99.3  99.3   100.3   
Costa Rica    100.0   97.7  96.9  92.0  97.1  
Mexico    100.0   95.2  94.2  94.2  94.0  
Indonesia    100.0    100.0   99.2  99.2  97.1  
Zambia    100.0   96.2  95.7  95.7  94.0  
Tanzania    100.0   97.1  94.5  94.5  92.4  
Mozambique    100.0   99.6  92.4  92.4  87.4  
Venezuela    100.0   99.3  95.3  95.3  93.0  
Egypt    100.0   99.1  94.3  94.3  89.4  
Tunisia    100.0   99.4  92.5  92.5  86.9  
Korea    100.0   85.6  85.6  85.6  82.8  
Morocco    100.0   93.6  90.0  90.0  67.6  
NOTE: The elimination of indirect taxes is measured additively. Simulation 1 represents the elimination of taxes on 
Production (TA), while Simulation 4 represents the elimination of all taxes on Production (TA), Consumption (TQ), Exports 
(TE), and Imports (TM). 
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Table 7. Exchange Rate Simulations (%) 
    Current Account Deficit as Percent of Absorption    Trade Share   
 





Change    Column 4 
(imports + exports)/GDP
 
Malawi   11.6  20.3  8.7    75.8   
Argentina    2.7 3.8 1.1    13.5   
Zimbabwe    5.1 8.7 3.6    51.1   
Brazil    2.4 3.3 0.8    15.4   
Costa Rica    4.9  12.2  7.3    85.1   
Mexico    3.5 8.7 5.1    63.6   
Indonesia   8.5  10.8  2.3    45.9   
Zambia   14.4  16.6  2.2    70.8   
Tanzania   9.1  11.3  2.2    46.4   
Mozambique   18.9  20.3  1.4    67.7   
Venezuela   -18.0  -11.6  6.4    56.5   
Egypt   -2.9  0.4  3.3    45.5   
Tunisia   2.5  10.6  8.1    85.6   
Korea    0.0 4.9 4.9    58.7   
Morocco    2.3 6.1 3.8    56.2   
  




Figure 1. Tax and Tariff Experiments,
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Figure 2. Stylized Import Tariff Experiments,





















0 . 00 . 51 . 01 . 52 . 02 . 5
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Figure 3. Stylized Exchange Rate Experiments
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Agricultural trade share divided by non-agricultural trade share
Note: The figure maps results from the 10 percent exchange rate appreciation simulations
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